

B. The Reference Elements

If liaison was a primal element in the development of OCD so, too, was reference. In brief, if the basic mission of the new intelligence concept for centralization of the national security alarm system was to collect intelligence and make it available to the estimators, then the very fact of availability presupposed the existence of an information storage capability--that is, a reference center. Thus, in establishing CIG, the January 1946 Presidential Memorandum 36/ also directed the new department to perform "such services of common concern as...can be more efficiently accomplished centrally." One of the services intended--along with the more glamorous covert activities--would logically be a reference service and five months later, in the first DCI's June Progress Report to the NIA, 37/ the center is identified by name for the first time--by the ^{several} list of numerous names, in fact. Specifically,

25X1A [] included a "Central Register of Intelligence Information" as one of the nine problems

"for which immediate solutions are well advanced"
and which could be more efficiently operated
centrally by CIG.

The "immediate solution" of the policy planners
had been to assign to the Office of Research and
Evaluation responsibility for developing the center
and in August 1946, ORE's first Administrative
Order 38/ in part directed its Executive Staff to
"prepare for the earliest practicable activation of
the projected...Intelligence Library"*--characteristic
terminology of ^{the} ~~the~~ time when the reference center
concept envisioned a "total library" containing
information for all intelligence purposes.

* The "Intelligence Library" appears on one of
the previously mentioned CIG organizational charts
for July 1946 (Plate No. 7, Figure 3). This ORE
chart also shows an "Information Center Branch,"
a mail ~~center~~, not a reference-type activity, which would
continue its expanded function until the Office of
Dissemination had achieved operational capability
(see page 60); and a proposed "Biographical Branch"
which would immediately become part of the reference
center planning. The "Technical and Scientific
Branch" would become the Office of Scientific
Intelligence in December 1948.

It is not particularly surprising that the Central Planning Staff had elected to place the reference activity in a production office as a secondary function--rather than make it an independent office as they had collection and dissemination. First, it probably did not seem illogical at the time to assign such a support function to the office which it was primarily intended to support--although this fact in itself would later prove detrimental to the center's development. Further, the assignment of the activity to ORE was regarded, at least theoretically, as temporary in nature. Witness the ORE Instruction which stated that

This Reference Branch will be a temporary responsibility pending organizational development and availability of space for later efficient independent operation of a CIG Reference Center. 39/

Placement notwithstanding, the following month there appeared the first official definition of the proposed reference center--almost ^{incorrectly} incidentally, as it were. On 1 October 1946 a CIG Directive 40/ established policy and procedures for the intelligence exploitation of American businessmen and concerns

with contacts abroad.* As part of the new operation, the Directive required the DCI to establish within the "Central Register a contact register of all existing and future business...contacts, from which clearances must be obtained by participating agencies before new contacts are approached." The Directive thus secondarily established the Contact Control Register--which would remain a part of the reference complex for about two years--and also defined both Registers. The Central Register, that is, the reference center, was defined as

A file to be established by and in the Central Intelligence Group in which will be recorded - in a form mutually agreed upon - the location, nature, reliability, etc., of all foreign intelligence information related to the national security in the possession of and acquired by the Government. The general function of Central Register is to provide a central and easily administered means of facilitating access by one agency to information in the physical possession of another

* The Commercial Contacts Branch, later the Contact Division, established 17 October 1946 when the Office of Operations (OO) was activated. 41/ FBIS was the other element included in OO's original charter (see page 61).

agency and the exchange of valuable information by and between authorized agencies.*

The statement of mission is interesting in retrospect-- not simply because it represents the first definition of the new reference center but more because its wording presaged a problem that would concern the early policy planners. The main thrust of the first mission description, particularly in its final sentence, clearly implies that the Register was envisioned as a common effort operated by and for all agencies. Influencing the CIG planners, however, was the increasing conviction that the reference center should be maintained primarily by and for CIG; that is, operated within the context of ORE's "correlation and evaluation of national security intelligence," with secondary service to other agencies. It was the latter philosophy, as we have already seen, that would shortly prevail.

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At any rate, by January 1947, in the same (1946) Year-End Report to the NIA, 43/ in which he highlighted OCD's increasing inter-agency activities, General Vandenberg was also able to state that

The administrative preliminaries to the creation of an interagency reference center have been underway for some time. Delays have resulted from my desire to initiate the project only when adequate and competent personnel are available, but several related projects which have been given consideration have been so developed that when the time comes they will easily fall into the Reference Center pattern. Among these are the Biographic Data Compilation Plan, the Central Contact Register...and Intelligence on Foreign Industrial Establishments.

The "administrative preliminaries" had begun, of course, during CIG's initial structuring phase in mid-1946 when the Central Planning Staff had established the first four operating offices and had placed the reference element in one of them--that is, as the Reference Branch of ORE. Recruitment of key officers to design the center was begun in the late summer of 1946 and

was brought back to

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CIG* from State Department in November--this time permanently. 44/ He was assigned to ORE and given the job of developing the reference center. At the same time, ICAPS,** which had replaced the CPS in July, was working to resolve inter-agency problems, including those involved in reference center planning, such as development of a coordinated biographic intelligence plan; acquisition and centralization of data on foreign industrial establishments (the "FIE plan"); and a programmed study by library

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* [] had previously been with CIG for about three months. In February 1946, one month after President Truman established NIA and CIG, [], Ludwell Montague and Merritt Ruddock were detailed by State (along with six others from the War and Navy Departments) to man the hastily-formed Central Reports Staff and prepare the President's Daily Summaries. [] subsequent selection for the reference center assignment was undoubtedly influenced by his pre-war EAM work with New York's American Museum of Natural History and his OSS wartime experience.

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** Created at the time of the Vandenberg reorganization of July 1946, ICAPS reflected the General's policy of replacing committee action with direct executive action--that is, ICAPS was given operational staff authority under the DCI to work out necessary coordination of intelligence activities between CIG and other government agencies in order to develop and recommend to the DCI, policies and procedures necessary for the most effective accomplishment of CIG's national intelligence mission. As successor to CPS, ICAPS was also responsible, of course, for internal CIG management policy as carried out by the Director's Executive for Personnel and Management.

and business machine experts (when recruited) to design an "interagency filing system and reporting manual." 45/

A planning staff was gradually being assembled to design the new facility within ORE* and among the key personnel first recruited were [redacted]

[redacted] joined CIG in November 1946; [redacted] and [redacted] in March 1947. Before the close of 1946,

moreover, the staff had been bolstered by the addition of four cleared [redacted] specialists who were brought in as consultants. 48/ ^{Since} The main emphasis of the early planners was on mechanization of a "super library," and the group was thus also ^{to} staffed with experienced librarians such as [redacted]

* On 31 October 1946, ORE's title had been changed from "Research and Evaluation" to "Reports and Estimates". 46/ Two weeks previously, the Eighth Meeting of the NIA dealt with CIG's proposed budget, including funds allocated for research--that is, for ORE. The Minutes record Assistant Secretary of State Donald Russell's request that the CIG office name be changed from "Research and Evaluation" since its similarity with State's office of "Research and Intelligence" suggested duplication of effort and thus might endanger budgetary approval. The Minutes then note General Vandenberg's agreement to "change the name of the CIG office." 47/

Chief Librarian of OO's Foreign Document Division, who would join the staff in June 1947.

As we have seen, the planners' mission was to design a truly centralized reference facility where, for the first time, an intelligence officer could find any type of information necessary to conduct any kind of intelligence operation--in other words, a "total library". A further requirement was that it be as completely mechanized as possible; not only to handle the large volume of incoming intelligence material, but to assure the requesting officer of prompt all-inclusive retrieval.

During the early planning stage the staff, quartered in "Q" Building, wrestled with the fundamentals of organization and procedures. Immediately apparent to them was the fact that there existed no such "total" reference facility--either within or outside the government--which was even remotely similar in extent to the one which they had been directed to design. There were many reference facilities in operation but they were all narrow in scope and parochial in content; serving one master, not an entire community of diverse users. Storage and retrieval mechanization,

where it existed at all, was relatively primitive. In short, there was no precedent to follow; no model from which to borrow. Whatever was developed by the staff would have to be created. Theirs would be the prototype.

It also quickly became evident to the Reference Branch planners that the information storage and retrieval requirements of the proposed reference center were too complex for a single library--both for effective management and for conventional library indexing systems. It was therefore decided that there would be a central repository for traditional library materials and a series of semi-autonomous "satellite" libraries for specialized materials containing biographic, industrial, photographic and domestic contact data; that all would be machine-controlled to the maximum extent possible; and that all would be under single management. There thus evolved, at first on paper, an initial organizational structure of an Intelligence Documents Division (Library), a Contact Control Register, ^(CCR) Biographical Intelligence Register, ^(BIR) Foreign Industrial Register, ^(FIR) the Graphic Materials Division, ^(GMD) and, providing machine support to all, the Central Index. In addition, there would be the

Executive and Coordinating Staffs.

Since the proposed mission of the Reference Branch was to receive, classify, record, prepare for retrieval and file all incoming intelligence material, work had also begun on developing systems and procedures. The incoming volume of the material was so heavy and the media diversification so great that the problem of systemizing the mass of information was a formidable task. In essence, the diverse types of media had to be sorted out and a coding system developed. Since the system had to cover a wide range of subjects of interest to the entire community, the group set out to adapt to their purposes portions of extant classification schemes--mainly the War Department's Basic Intelligence Directive (BID), which was not a storage and retrieval coding system, per se, but rather a guide for field collection of intelligence. At the outset, the group sought to design, as directed, an "interagency filing system" and worked with representatives of other

departments but the intransigence* of the latter, their unwillingness to adapt to a common system, ^{increasingly} made the effort fruitless. Although it was to take more than a year, the planners eventually developed the Intelligence Subject Code (ISC)--a classification system for coding the area and subject content of intelligence documents. Simultaneously, the machine specialists were working to mechanize the system, seeking a solution that would combine the advantages of IBM punch cards and rapid electronic reproduction of document descriptions. The Finch Telefax equipment (a facsimile printer) supplied the missing element and the planners began the development

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* Something less than a willingness to cooperate frequently characterized the attitudes of the other departments during CIG's formative period. In a December 1946 report to the Chief of ICAPS, one of the CIG members frankly stated that many of the difficulties encountered by ICAPS in planning CIG had been caused by other IAB representatives' uncertainty regarding CIG's permanence and [then] ill-defined mission; lack of vision by some subordinates who feared transfer of functions to CIG would jeopardize their own positions; the fear of service departments to surrender important operations to a quasi-civilian organization; and frequent changes in policy of IAB members as announced at ICAPS meetings. 49/

of what would become the CIA Intellofax System. The system permitted machine retrieval of data from the files through the medium of Faxcards--that is, an IBM card, code-punched according to the ISC for subject and area, upon which a description or abstract of the document had been printed, and which was delivered to the searcher in the form of a continuous Intellofax Tape. It would take until July of 1949 before the system would become fully operative but the groundwork had been laid by the early planners.* Similar classification systems and internal operating procedures had to be developed for each of the specialized libraries--or registers. Procedures were designed to redirect the heavy flow of incoming intelligence documents through the processing machinery of the Reference Branch. (All incoming material was then being routed by OCD's Dissemination Branch to ORE's "Information Center" for distribution.)

* Both the Intellofax System and the Intelligence Subject Code will be discussed in greater detail in the sections below on the Library and the Machine Division.

As the planning continued, the Reference Branch staff grew slowly--painfully so--and as personnel reported for duty, they were assigned to one of the Branch components. A skeletal organization was gradually developed and the literally few people in the library and each of the Registers began putting the untried plans into operation. Internal procedures and proposed systems had to be tested and improved. Bases of information, upon which to build the centralized reference repositories, had to be developed. To a very considerable extent, the new staff members achieved these objectives by visiting every similar organization, both governmental and private, which they could identify. In each instance, systems and procedures were studied to determine their possible applicability to the partially developed CIG reference system. More important, such visits helped accelerate the establishment of data bases. Many of the parochial files that were reviewed were integrated into the Reference Branch data base, either by indexing the material and storing it on machine cards, or by outright transfer of the hard copy file

to the central collection. Biographic data in both forms, for example, was obtained from the Department of State and the service departments. Library equipment and collections (either in whole or in part) were obtained from numerous government libraries like the Library of Congress and from such unlikely sources as the Civilian Production Administration of the Office of Housing Expediter. Similarly, the industrial and graphics specialists added sizeable increments to their data bases as, for instance, the entire OSS photo collection which the Graphic Materials Division inherited from State. While the EAM and systems experts accompanied the substantive specialists on their visits to other government agencies, their efforts were concentrated on private industry, investigating all possibly applicable electrical, electronic and photographic hardware. In some cases, shelf items were applicable. In other cases, necessary equipment was created or converted from available models.

In short, the activity of the earliest Reference Branch personnel was hectically multi-faceted. Newly arrived upon the scene, they simultaneously struggled to implement and improve procedures; to receive, index

and file for retrieval the routine flow of material which had begun to come in; relieve ORE and other CIG elements of the files they had amassed; locate and integrate into their system large data collections from other agencies; and respond to the information requests which had begun to arrive.

This earliest developmental period, of course, took well over a year and some of the more comprehensive subsystems, such as Intellofax, weren't implemented for about two years. During the developmental period, the embryonic Reference Branch could, at best, barely limp along, pending full development of the basic systems and, more importantly, the acquisition of adequate staff. In retrospect, it is difficult to determine the developmental status of any one of the units at any given time during the first year; for example, the date they began operations or the extent to which they each "began" operations. As noted in Chapter II above, all six components of the Reference Branch officially became operative between January and June of 1947. Indeed, a memorandum issued by the DCI's Assistant Executive Director on 25 June 1947 informed all Assistant Directors that the Reference Branch was

prepared to begin operations in all its stated functions. The announcement went so far as to instruct the AD's to "make such adjustments in current operational procedures as may be necessary to conform therewith." 50/ Officially, then, the Reference Branch was operational. The operational capability, however, must have been minimal. What with all the developmental tasks that had to be carried on, there were undoubtedly too few people available during the first half of 1947 to achieve any meaningful operational capability. In fact, as late as 31 March 1947, an ORE personnel roster shows only a total of people assigned to the Reference Branch. 51/ With such severely limited manpower, the major effort must have been on in-house development. Nonetheless, as a result of the superb efforts of the early planners, the central reference facility was becoming fairly well established within the first several months of its existence--certainly in blueprint, if not in operating fact. In January 1947 the operation was moved from "Q" Building to the first floor of Central Building in the 2430 "E" Street complex (the remainder of ORE occupied the second floor), and in February was named Acting Chief, Reference Branch, ORE. 52/

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Late in the first quarter of 1947, the staff completed their planning and on 28 March 1947,

25X1 [] submitted to ICAPS the proposed Statement of Mission and Table of Organization for the Reference Branch, as approved by []

then Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates.

On 25 June, ICAPS approved the plan with certain changes in the functional statement. The changes were important with regard to the scope of the reference center's responsibility. Previously, we noted indecision on the part of the early policy planners as to whether the centralized reference facility should be an inter-agency partnership or whether it should be operated by, and primarily for CIG, with secondary responsibility to the other intelligence agencies. The modifications by ICAPS clearly indicated that the policy makers had opted for the latter. The Statement of Mission submitted to ICAPS in March had echoed the original concept implied in the first CIG definition of the proposed reference element in October 1946 which, it will be recalled, envisioned the facility as a common effort operated by and for all the intelligence agencies.

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Specifically, the [] proposal stated that the mission of the Branch would be

...to centralize various reference functions related to the intelligence activities of the United States Government, and to provide a Reference Library for CIG... This Branch serves as a Reference Center for CIG and the member agencies.

However, the approved ICAPS version of June officially declared that the mission of the Reference Branch was

To be the repository for all intelligence and intelligence information to be permanently filed by CIG, to maintain records of all available intelligence sources, intelligence information and intelligence; to provide a reference library for CIG; and to establish, in coordination with OCD, procedures for utilization of its materials and catalogs by other agencies.

Moreover, whereas the March submission proposed as the primary duty of the Chief the establishment of reference activities for CIG and the member agencies, the June ICAPS version directed him to "Establish the central reference activities for CIG, and maintain appropriate liaison, administrative and policy making activities." 53/ It was now indelibly clear that the policy makers were no longer undecided about the reference center's scope of responsibility.

With regard to this very fundamental principal, they had finally decided that the center would not be a community partnership effort but a wholly owned and operated CIG facility, the services of which would also be available to other agencies, circumstances permitting. Throughout its history, the reference element, whatever its organizational title, would serve first as a mechanism for its parent organization and secondarily for the other agencies, with the latter service pendulated by budgetary realities.

The Reference Branch organizational structure approved by ICAPS was identical with that developed by the planners and was by then (in June) actually in rudimentary operation. With the T/O pegged at 25X1A ☐ positions, the Branch's components and their position allocations (indicated parenthetically), were the Office of the Chief ☐ the Executive and Coordinating Staffs ☐, and six operating components: the Contact Control Register ☐, the Biographical Intelligence Register ☐ the Foreign Industrial Register ☐, a Graphic Materials Division ☐, Intelligence Documents Division or Library ☐

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and a Central Index ☐) to provide Branch-wide machine support. (See Figure 6)

Such was the first Reference Center, the name by which it was generally known although it would ^{continue to} be officially designated as the Reference Branch until its transfer from ORE several months later. At the time of the ICAPS approval in June, the infantile operation was functioning weakly as it struggled with untried procedures and woeful understaffing. What no one could then foresee was the fact that the plan would prove operationally successful. Over the years, countless changes in systems, procedures and objectives would be effected; divisions would appear and disappear; and eventually ^{much} ~~most~~ of the operation would be computerized. Nonetheless, the fundamental central reference system as originally conceived would prove sound in principle--that is, the channeling of "all" intelligence documentation to the reference facility for general and specialized indexing and storage by the central library and the specialized registers; category retrieval of documents on demand; and, as will be discussed below, the presumably unplanned development of area expertise for substantive

analysis and the production of finished or semi-finished intelligence within fields of specialty. In fact, the prototype reference center of June 1947 would remain essentially unchanged in structure and system for three decades*--and even, the same basic principles of operation would prevail although structured within a geographic rather than a functional framework.

Not surprisingly, the prototype organization with which the Reference Branch began its long career was not the first arrangement considered by the planners. Two early and subsequently discarded organizational charts show that initially a two-deputy structure had been considered for the Reference Branch with a Deputy for Intelligence Source Materials and a Deputy for Machine Operations. Judging from the

* In late 1967 and early 1968, ^{the}DDI, R. Jack Smith, reorganized the functionally arranged Office of Central Reference (OCD's new title from 1955) into the area-based Central Reference Service (CRS) and imposed a one-third reduction in manpower.

two charts, and in the absence of explanatory functional statements, it is apparent that the "main library" was under the Deputy for Intelligence Source Materials and consisted of four divisions, one each for Books, Periodicals and Newspapers, for Pictorial Records, for Maps* and for Intelligence Reports and Research Papers. The four "satellite" libraries or Registers (for contact controls, biographics, industrial data and machine operations), appear under the Deputy for Machine Operations. (Figure 7)** A short time later,

* Transfer of the map intelligence function from the Department of State to CIG had been under discussion but it would not be until June 1947 that the NIA approved the transfer. 54/ The function was reconstituted within ORE in August, as a separate branch, rather than as part of the Reference Center. 55/

25X1A9A 14 Dec 1947") is probably in error. By the latter date, the Reference Center had progressed beyond the stage of structural experimentation and was acceptably functioning within the single-deputy framework approved by ICAPS. The chart was most likely passed to two days prior to an internally scheduled due date.

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presumably January 1947, the same two-deputy organizational configuration persists with minor changes in the second preliminary chart. (Figure 8) The point of interest engendered by the two charts and other sources is not solely that another organizational structure had initially been contemplated. Rather, the evidence reflects what was apparently a fundamentally different functional concept on the part of the earliest policy planners; namely, development of a reference system exclusively involved in the indexing and retrieval of documents and books. In other words, a machine-supported general and specialized reference activity devoid of any substantive analysis capability. Corroboratively, it will be recalled that the policy planners had opted for unlimited use of business machines in developing a reference center. As a result, it is apparent that mechanization played a major role in their design concept and any analysis capability was incidental--if it was considered at all. There is only slight evidence in the earliest charts and position registers,

moreover, which would suggest that the actual designers of the reference facility might have foreseen, or at least sensed the need for an analytical capability. For instance, the three earliest organizational schematics mentioned above contain one such evidential item; that is, the "Finished Products" element for the Foreign Industrial Register in Figures 7 and 8 which, in all likelihood, probably refers to such machine-produced reference aids as listings and tabulations. Similarly, in all of the mission statements for the Reference Branch's components, as proposed by the designers in March and approved by ICAPS in June (Figure 6), there is also only one possible suggestion of an analysis function and that is the charge included in the mission for the Biographical Intelligence Register (BIR) to "Provide and/or locate upon request detailed biographical information regarding any important foreigner."--again most probably information in the form of machine-retrieved documents from the files. Finally, the Tables of Organization for the components contain positions

for "Reports Editors" and "Reports Analysts." 26/
Here too, the intent is rather vague and the
quantity insignificant--only 12 positions out of
the total of ^{25X1A} ☐--and the type of "analysis"
implied was probably analogous to that of a library's
"research analyst"--that is, expertise in locating
a hard-to-find reference. Whether or not these bits
of admittedly questionable evidence suggest
foresight on the part of the reference center's
planners is, however, largely academic. The fact
remains that if the need for analysis had not been
apparent to the early policy makers and ^{25X1A} ☐
planners, it became almost immediately evident to
the first reference specialists. They quickly
discovered that the input and retrieval aspects of
a machine-based operation could not be divorced from
analysis; that even their primary decisions to code
or not to code, to correct factual errors in dates
and name spellings and to select pertinent extracts
were actions which constituted basic analysis.
However slowly, such decisions became increasingly

... intellectual, involving detection, evaluation and interpretation, and even before the end of the first year it had become evident that the process was not one of perfunctory indexing for storage and retrieval. Rather, analysis had clearly begun to emerge as an integral and inseparable part of the reference analyst's job. In fact, after only nine months of existence for the Reference Branch the Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates, Theodore Babbitt, stated that analysts in the Branch's Biographical Intelligence Register (BIR) should maintain a reports-writing capability. At the outset, it had apparently been agreed that the Department of State would bear primary responsibility for the preparation of biographic reports for CIG. The Department's Biographic Information Division, however, lacked sufficient manpower to carry out the responsibility and BIR, to fill the gap, had begun writing biographic reports for CIG requesters (rather than transmitting batches of pertinent, raw documents). It was this "emergency" production effort which Babbitt said should be maintained, according to a memorandum for the record dated 6 August 1947 (and presumably

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prepared by []). Babbitt reportedly held that BIR should have the capability of preparing biographic studies "in addition to its regularly allotted functions" (that is, locating, indexing, recording and retrieving biographic information); and that the Register should recruit people "capable of doing biographical research work." 57/ That the character of the reference analyst's job was changing was indelibly recorded in November when an officer from Administration and Management (A&M), reporting on her manpower survey of the Reference Branch, approved [] initial T/O but recommended that

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A substantial saving in personnel could be achieved if Reference Center register activity was confined exclusively to punch card recording. The establishment of files and the extracting and annotating of reports for file purposes which occurs in FIR, BIR and CCR are time-consuming and require the services of many professional employees. 58/

The trend toward analysis in the reference analyst jobs was to continue, however, with the eventual ¹² development of effective and highly-regarded officers who were recognized authorities in their support specialties--

for example, industrial officers, graphics specialists and biographic officers. The apex of distinction in this respect would accrue to the Biographic Register which would become the most prestigious component in OCD, culminating with the DCI's directive of October 1961, 59/ and subsequent DDI action, authorizing BR to produce finished intelligence--the only ^{Reference} Register ever so empowered.

At any rate, June 1947 probably marked the first milestone in the early development of the Reference Branch. During its early months of existence, the Branch had struggled through the confusion of emergence but by June, as noted ^{previously} previously, its mission and function had been approved by ICAPS. At about the same time, and equally important to its development, the Branch was finally allocated sufficient working area. Space limitations in Central Building had begun to inhibit even the slow growth of that early period and even the relatively small number of newcomers that the recruitment program was beginning to produce could not be

integrated into the operation but had to be "held"
in A&M. Finally, after ~~several weeks~~ storage facilities had been
installed, on 12 June 1947 the Reference Branch
moved into the 4th Wing of the first and second
floors of "M" Building on 26th Street near
Constitution Avenue. At last unified in adequate
quarters, the Branch began to show small but
meaningful progress. By the end of the month,
the March on-duty strength of 28 had risen to 48
and in late July stood at 59. 60/ Developmental
and operational activities were accelerated and with
regard to the former, Intellofax* negotiations moved
beyond the initial May contact with [redacted]

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[redacted] and by July involved [redacted]

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[redacted] By late August the library's Classification

Unit had completed the general framework of the "all-
inclusive" subject and area classification schedule
(later the Intelligence Subject Code or ISC), and
interagency subcommittees were attempting to develop
additional classification segments for coding military

* Actually, the name "Intellofax" would not be
coined until about mid-1949 when the system was
implemented.

subjects (especially for Navy and Air Force) not covered by the initial plan. In the same month, the Branch's machine specialists began indexing FBIB's Daily Reports by subject and area for OO; and were drawn further into the new business of providing administrative support by automating personnel records for A&M's Personnel Division. The "search and find" visits to other installations increased in number and in June alone, over 100 meetings and visits were logged. As a result of the contacts, ^{additional} numerous large file increments were added to the Reference Branch's specialized information bases. For instance, the Contact Control Register, which had started its data base with the inherited OSS Survey of Foreign Experts file (on U.S. sources of foreign intelligence), now arranged for a steady flow of new data from the [redacted] the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Division. By August it had developed machine control on over 1100 foreign intelligence sources in the U.S. Similarly, the Intelligence Documents Division had

arranged to take over the entire reference collection
of the deactivated Office of Housing Expediter; the
Foreign Industrial Register began building its data
base by acquiring the Industrial Card File (on
Russian installations) from the Army's Special
Document Section in Fort Holabird; ^{and} while BIR had
obtained and was indexing State's Category File
(biographic information arranged by organizational
affiliation) and was completing priority work on
"Project 1640"--locating and centralizing under
machine control information on all foreign scientists
available in U.S. agencies.

During the same three-month period (June
through August 1947), most, but not all of the
reference components, were capable of conducting
servicing operations. As recounted in Chapter II
above, the previous historians indicated that all
Reference Branch elements were organized by July 1947
except for the Biographical Intelligence Register,
which "(although it was prominent in early plans),
was delayed on account of special interagency
problems that needed prior solution." Further

research, however, shows that BIR was activated during the first half of 1947 and, indeed, before the foreign industrial and graphics elements. Organized as early as April or May, BIR had established a considerable data base by June (over 1200 names) and in July handled 35 requests. 61/ In addition, and quite logically, the previous history did not deal with the Contact Control Register since it would be transferred to the Office of Operations in August of 1948. 62/

In general, then, by the end of August 1947 all six elements of the Reference Branch were staffed (however minimally) and in various stages of operation. Their internal procedural patterns had been designed, their data bases established and all, with the exceptions of the Foreign Industrial Register and the Graphics Materials Division, were actually answering requests. As a branch of the Office of Reports and Estimates, the new reference facility was developing slowly--but apparently too slowly--and in September it was transferred out of ORE and re-established as a

separate office under the Executive for Administration and Management. (Figure 9) From this point on, the Reference Branch officially as well as popularly was designated as the Reference Center.

The reasons motivating the administrative relocation are not at all clear. It will be recalled that assignment of the Reference Branch and its development to ORE had been specified as

a temporary responsibility pending organizational development and availability of space for later efficient independent operation of a CIG Reference Center. 63/

Perhaps management, that is, Ted Shannon, had come to the conclusion that the reference facility had been developed to the point where it could strike out on its own. After all, it was a "common concern" utility for all of CIA and the entire Intelligence Community and not the functionary of any single office. More probable, however, were the reasons noted in Chapter II which had been advanced by previous historians--namely, that as stepchild in

a production office, the Branch's reference activities tended to be inordinately channeled into that particular form of production; and that the reference activity, regarded as incidental to the parent office's primary function of production, received short shrift in budgetary and manpower allocations. Identical views were ~~expressed~~ *historically reviewed* seven years later by James M. Andrews, the man who would subsequently direct the merged reference-collection-dissemination operation:

It very quickly became evident that the Reference Center could not hope to fulfill its mission of developing advanced techniques and equipment, and of serving all offices and staffs of the Agency, as long as it was located in ORE. Being only one of several divisions in a single office, it failed to receive from ORE the support in terms of budget and manpower which were needed in order that it might have the strength to achieve its objectives...

In considering all the elements which might have played a part in dictating the transfer, it would not be whimsical to assume that [] had more than a detached interest in the Reference Center. Having worked so closely with [] in

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developing the Center, he would presumably be anxious to guarantee to the Center's operators a maximum opportunity to prove its conceptual soundness. Whatever the reasons, it is indisputable that the reference activity eventually did fare better as a quasi-independent function under A&M than as a subordinate activity in a production office. In fact, in his retrospective recollections recounted above, Andrews also stated that

...In this new location, the Reference Center received far more administrative support, and was able to commence building up its manpower both in quality and in quantity. Contracts were let for the development of special machine equipment, and a serious attack was made on the major problems which were awaiting solution. 64/

There would not be, of course, any immediate developmental surge for the Reference Center. It would take some time before the administrative benefits resulting from its new status would become apparent ^{but} and progress ^{did} would continue at only a slightly accelerated tempo during the final quarter of 1947. By December,

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There would not be, of course, any immediate developmental surge for the Reference Center. It would take some time before the administrative benefits resulting from its new status would become apparent but progress did continue at a slightly accelerated tempo during the final quarter of 1947. By December, for instance, although the

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Reference Center on-board strength had only risen to a total of [] people, against an authorized total of [] further developmental and operational progress had been achieved. With regard to the single most important developmental target (Intellofax), the design of the "all-inclusive" unified coding scheme and hardware for the retrieval and bibliographic printout system had been brought to near completion. The Community-oriented document coding plan had been developed by Library and ADP personnel to the point where it was ready for implementation but continued reluctance on the part of other agencies to adapt to the common system had virtually decided Agency planners to go ahead on their own. Similarly, the design of special machines to handle the coded documents had reached a crucial point by the end of the year. The systems experts had inspected equipment produced by [] and many other companies; and had investigated systems and machines in use in other agencies. None met the Center's requirements as well as the proposed [] An over-all plan and

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funds to develop and produce the special equipment were approved on 4 December and the contract was let with 25X1A5A1 the following month.

Operationally, the Registers were also beginning to function with primitive effectiveness. By the end of the year, their data bases, although still unimpressive in size, had nonetheless grown to useable proportions. Some of these document collections were already under machine control while others were manual files, pending final development of the master coding scheme. The Intelligence Documents Division (Library), for instance, had hand-filed 150,000 documents by source and among the other Registers, IBM punched card techniques controlled almost 25,000 names in BIR, about the same number of foreign industrial installations in FIR and almost 2,000 domestic sources of foreign intelligence (organizations and individuals) in CCR. From these data bases, the Registers had begun to provide CIA and the other IAC members with the reference service that would

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characterize their operations for decades to come. With a staff of 23, for example, the Intelligence Documents Division in November serviced 299 requesters and in December a significant CIA Instruction 65/ centralized the accountability and procurement of all foreign and domestic books in the new library--ending uncontrolled independent purchasing by Agency components. Similarly, the other Registers had also moved into a primary operating mode. Most active were the []

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[] Biographic Intelligence and Foreign Industrial Registers, whose December personnel totals stood at [], respectively. BIR was now unofficially recognized as the focal point for biographic information on foreign scientists and technologists (S&T) and preliminary NSC action had been initiated to formally delegate the S&T biographic responsibility to CIA--that is, to the Reference Center's Biographic Intelligence Register. Least capable of providing more than token service was the Graphic Materials Division. The last of the Registers to be developed, GMD, working with

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Central Index specialists, had completed its procedural and coding plans and had only recently begun to function with its staff of eight. The Central Index had only five people on board but, with the help of at least the four [] consultants, had made considerable progress. In addition to completing the hardware design of the main index, storage and retrieval system and sharing in the development of the "unified" document coding scheme with Library personnel, the small staff had begun machine indexing current material in the []

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[] at the rate of 500 cards per day. after eliminating the three-month backlog it had inherited in August; was key-punching machine indexes to map and pictorial material for GMD; and automating personnel records for A&M's Personnel Division, as well as coordinating the utilization of machines for the entire Agency.

From the outset, the Central Index had been directed by [] who, as previously noted, had been one of the first people recruited

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25X1A9A 25X1A9A
by [] in March 1947. His Deputy, []
25X1A9A [] had joined CIA in ^{MARCH} ~~November~~ of the same year.
25X1A9A
Previously, [] had worked briefly for IBM
before joining State Department and serving a
consular tour in Poland. His forte was organization
25X1A9A and administration. [] with 15 years of experience
in his field, was the machine systems expert. The
two of them, along with people like [] and
the Library's [] were the prime
designers of the Reference Center. Originally
with the ONI Library, [] had transferred to
? CIG in December 1946 as Chief Librarian in OO's
Foreign Document Division. Six months later he
was reassigned as the Reference Center's Chief
Librarian (later CIA Librarian) with complete
authority for the Library's planning, staffing,
organization and management. Similarly, the Contact
Control Register had also been under single leader-
ship since its inception. [] had
entered CIG in November 1946, along with []
and was immediately appointed by the latter to
organize CCR. [] was chief of the

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Graphic Materials Division, having served in that 25X1A9A
25X1A9A position since July 1947, and
was apparently the key officer in the Foreign
Industrial Register. Among all the Registers, BIR
alone was still without continuing leadership at
the close of the year. From about May,
25X1A9A had served throughout 1947, apparently
without title, as the focal point for activities 25X1A9A
in BIR. He would be replaced in January 1948
by from the Department of State, 25X1A9A
who would serve as Acting Chief for the first
quarter of the year and subsequently ^{return} to the
Department.* For the remainder of 1948, 25X1A9A
and, from about September would
serve as Acting Chiefs until the appointment of 25X1A9A

25X1A9A

- * would return to CIA in mid-1961, after the Agency had absorbed State's biographic operation, to serve as Program Coordinator for the expanded Biographic Register.

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25X1A9A

[redacted] as chief of the Register in
January 1949.

Thus, by the end of 1947, its first full year of operation, the Reference Center was fairly well established and its continued development would remain uninterrupted by the reorganizational upheavals which were destined to sweep the Agency during the next several years.

The year 1948 began a new era, not only for the Reference Center but for the entire collection-dissemination-reference function. It was at this point in time, as described in the previous section, that the two major events occurred which would have a major impact on the function's development:

the advent of James M. Andrews and A&M's [redacted]
decision to merge OCD and the Reference Center
because of the former's procedural ineffectiveness
and the close inter-relationship between the two
activities. Toward the close of 1947, [redacted]
had privately apprised [redacted] of the two impending
developments. In addition [redacted] Management
Branch under [redacted] already had completed

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plans for the RC-OCD merger by the time Andrews arrived in January 1948 to become chief of the Reference Center. Scarcely three months later, on 3 May 1948, the Reference Center and OCD were combined into a single Office of Collection and Dissemination under Andrews. 66/ ^{25X1A}

the former AD/CD, returned to the Navy.

Characteristically, Jamie Andrews had obtained carte blanche authority to change the merger plans and the organizational surgery was performed according to the blueprint which he and his staff

^{25X1A9A} developed, and not according to the plan prepared by and his management officers--"much to chagrin," according to one source. 67/

The new Office of Collection and Dissemination that was formed in May 1948 was ^{the} organizational as well as the functional model that would remain basically unchanged for almost twenty years.

Collection and dissemination had now been functionally geared to the vitally intertwined reference activity under single direction. The new Office, of course,

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contained the six original reference divisions, plus the collection and dissemination activities from the original OCD. The functions of the latter had been reduced in scope and re-established as the seventh office component--the Liaison Division (LD), chief of which would be [REDACTED] Thus, the reconstructed OCD contained the Machine Division, the Library, the Biographic, Industrial, Graphic and Contact Control Registers, and the new Liaison Division.* It was also at this time, it will be

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* To avoid excessive detail, the traditional titles of OCD's subdivisions will be used from this point forward, even though titular changes would continue to occur for two years--e.g., for most of 1948 the Central Index would be known as the Machine Methods Branch before final designation as the Machine Division; the Registers' names would be shortened; and organizational indicators would differ until the CIA General Order of September 1949 68/ directed Agency adoption of the Federal vertical departmental organizational structure (office-to-division-to-branch).

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recalled that the mail and courier activities of A&M's Central Records Division were transferred to OCD, thus returning the Top Secret and registered document control functions. On 21 May, three weeks after the merger, Dr. Andrews appointed an Air Force Colonel [redacted] 25X1A9A Deputy Assistant Director and [redacted] was named Executive Assistant Director. 69/

25X1A9A

By the end of May, other events of developmental significance had occurred. First, the Library's Community-oriented document coding scheme, now officially called the Intelligence Subject Code (ISC), was in experimental operation. Early in 1948, the system planners had finally concluded that the document classification scheme had crystallized to a degree that justified its use on a trial basis and that the ^{Intell of day} ~~Intelligence~~ System--that is, the ISC and the necessary hardware then under development--gave reasonably sure promise of providing a satisfactory mechanical solution to the reference problems. On 15 March 1948, the first edition of the Intelligence Subject Code Manual

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was published and in April the Library began the ISC indexing of intelligence documents and the preparation of descriptive abstracts for selected documents. Pending the development of the Intellofax hardware, the indexed documents were stored manually. In brief, the Intelligence Subject Code, or ISC, was a six-digit numerical framework developed by OCD with IAC, ORE and (later) OSI cooperation, which permitted the subject and area indexing of intelligence documents for machine retrieval. The first manual, of course, was experimental and constant changes were necessary to adapt the new system to consumer demands. By October 1948, however, the volume would have been increased to where the coding operation was keeping pace with the flow of incoming documents.

The second significant development in early 1948 was the first official assignment of a Community-wide reference responsibility to the new Office of Collection and Dissemination.

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On 25 May the National Security Council issued NSCID No. 8 which formally delegated to CIA--that is, to OCD's Biographic Register--primary responsibility for the maintenance of data on foreign scientists and technologists. 70/ This assignment would remain the only formally delegated Community reference responsibility for OCD and its successor organizations.

By mid-1948, OCD's growth impetus had accelerated noticeably. Its divisions' operating procedures had been improved to the point where they were all functioning fairly effectively. In addition, the Agency's recruitment program was now beginning to provide a steady flow of new people and by the end of July 1948, OCD had an on-board strength of ^{25X1A} The office was, in fact, in the early stages of a ten-year growth period and the expansion would not even be effected by the loss of two functions in the latter half of 1948. The first operation to be transferred out of OCD was the Contact Control Register. Effective 26 August, CCR was re-established within the Contact Branch

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of OO's Source Development Division (originally the Control Division). Responsibility for providing machine support for CCR's operations remained with OCD. 71/ [redacted], who had directed CCR from the beginning, did not accompany the operation to OO but shortly afterward joined the newly-established Office of Policy Coordination (OPC).* The transfer of the Contact Control Register to OO's Contact Branch was the culmination of a long effort by the latter to completely control access to the index of [redacted] sources.

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Actually, CCR's original placement in the Reference Center had been arbitrary and had probably resulted from two factors: the availability

* OPC was established on 1 September 1948 under Frank Wisner to handle covert psychological operations. It thus became the fifth CIA office, joining OCD, ORE, OO and OSD. In December the sixth major component was added when the Office of Scientific Intelligence was formed (Figure 10).

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of CIG's only business machine capability in the Center and [] previous exposure to the "contact" business. After V-E Day in mid-1944, [] then with the General Staff Corps,* had been recruited by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to set up West Coast offices and conduct a "Survey of Foreign Experts"--that is, to locate organizations and individuals in the western states with knowledge of Far Eastern countries and to index their capabilities. As a result of the operation, a file of some 10,000 5x8 cards was amassed, each of which indexed, among other things, the source's area, language and professional knowledge. After the war, a complete set of the cards was placed in the OSS

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- * [] served on the staff of Col. Alfred McCormack, Military Intelligence Chief, General Staff Corps.

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Archives 72/ and it was a selected portion of these cards which became the base for CCR's files. It is not so surprising, then, that the contact control operation was initially placed in the new Reference Center--partly, one would assume, because of [] experience and the enthusiasm he had conveyed to Alfred McCormack;* but most certainly because the "index" would thus become part of the Center's vaulted machine controls. In actual fact, at the time there was no other place to put the activity. It was very shortly afterward, however, that the Contact Branch of the new Office of Operations was established** and the battle was joined. Where the mission of OO/Contact

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* Col. McCormack had left the General Staff Corps to become the first Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence. In an April 1946 memorandum to the D/CIG, McCormack was one of the few to urge that the U.S. continue its wartime domestic collection effort.

** October 1946.

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was to "open up" U.S. organizations in order to tap the flow of intelligence information from their foreign representatives, CCR's job in OCD was to machine index for rapid retrieval the information producing capabilities of the individual sources involved. From the outset, this functional dichotomy was anathema to the officers of the Contact Branch's Field Division. In their opinion, no one, apparently not even their own headquarters people, could properly protect the identities of their U.S. sources. As later noted by the Contact Division's historian, "it was obvious...that the field officers would never consent to the inclusion of their sources' identities in an index available to all of the outside intelligence agencies; or, to venture into a completely different area of dispute, to other elements of CIA." 73/ The contact control index, or CCR, remained in OCD for two more years before the OO/C position prevailed and, as we have seen, the operation was transferred out of OCD and absorbed by OO's Contact Branch.

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The second function to be transferred out of OCD during the last half of 1948 was the map activity carried out by the Map Division of the Graphics Register. In June of 1947, the State-OSS map library and geographic intelligence functions had been transferred to CIA and in August were re-established in ORE as the Map Intelligence Branch under ^{25X1A} [redacted]. From its inception, the Graphics Register had carried out a closely-allied function in its Map Division: the codification and machine indexing of essential information on foreign maps of intelligence value held by governmental and non-governmental institutions in the U.S. It was this activity which, in September 1948, was moved out of OCD and merged in with the Map Library Division of ORE's Map Branch. Again, however, the machine support responsibility remained with OCD's Machine Division. 74/

By the close of 1948, OCD's rate of growth was still increasing despite the two functional excisions. In December the on-board personnel

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25X1 strength had risen to [] against an authorized
25X1 total of [] as compared to [] people and an
25X1A authorized total of [] just 12 months previously.
Operationally, the divisions were eliminating the
functional flaws but service demands were increasing
even faster than personnel strength. Key reassign-
ments continued to be rather frequent. In August,

25X1A9A [] was brought into OCD as Chief of
the Industrial Register where []

been Chief pro tem. In September, []
returned to the Air Force to be succeeded as OCD's
Deputy Assistant Director by Colonel []

25X1A9A on loan from the Army; and [] replaced

[] as Acting Chief of the Biographic 25X1A9A
Register. In December, Commander []

25X1 who had been first the Navy and later the CIA desk
officer in the old OCD's liaison operation, was named
Chief of the Liaison Division, replacing the division's
first chief, []

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With one exception, the key assignments

remained unchanged during 1949. The single

exception was the arrival of [] who

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became Chief of the Biographic Register on

3 January 1949, 75/ retaining [] as his

25X1A9A

25X1A9A deputy. [] in GR and [] in IR still had

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no deputies--at least in the titular sense. In

25X1A9A the new Liaison Division, []

25X1A9A

[] served as [] deputy;

25X1A9A [] worked under Joe Becker as Assistant

25X1A9A

Librarian; and [] continued as []

25X1A9A

deputy in the Machine Division. By 1949, the

Executive and Coordinating Staffs had been replaced

25X1A9A

by the Administrative Staff and the Operations Staff;

the former headed by [] (although she would

25X1A9A

not be formally appointed until December of 1950 76/),

25X1A9A

and the latter [] In the Library,

25X1A9A

[] had succeeded []

25X1A9A

January 1949 as Top Secret Control Officer (TSCO),

CIA Records Administrator and Custodian of Registered

25X1A9A

Documents. [] the original TSCO had transferred to ORE when the Central Records Division had been merged with the reorganized OCD in May 1948. (77*) In February 1949, Central Records Division itself was reorganized within OCD. The mail and courier activity became the responsibility of OCD's Administrative Staff and the Administrative Records, Top Secret Control and the Records Management (CIA Archives) functions were assigned to the Library.

During the first eight months of 1949, OCD's on-board strength had risen more than 12% to [] people and the authorized T/O had been increased by almost 15% to [] In addition, the Office's operations were finally beginning to achieve the

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* Throughout the first 25 years of reference service history, there have been only five Top Secret Control Officers (excluding the original TSCO, [] who never joined OCD): [] from January 1949; [] from April 1950; [] from September 1954; [] in 1967; and [] from 1968.

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functional effectiveness that comes with experience. After its late ~~start~~^{25X1A}, for example, the Graphics Register, with ☐ people, handled over 1400 requests for still photos and motion picture film during Fiscal Year 1949. Within its field of responsibility-- preparing biographic reports and providing other types of biographic support--the Biographic Register was amassing files on all types of foreign personalities and not simply on the foreign scientific and technological personalities for whom it was held responsible by NSCID No. 8. During Fiscal Year 1949, the Register's staff of ☐ people had responded to 1229 requestors; the Industrial Register, also with ☐ people on board, had answered ☐ queries; and the reconformed Liaison Division, with ☐ people, had provided 2413 collection and liaison services. The Library's broader reference function naturally resulted in a far larger request total of over 22,000 for the same fiscal period. It also had the largest working staff of ☐ people. Cumulatively, the OCD

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components during Fiscal Year 1949--that is, after two to three years of operating experience, depending upon the unit--serviced a total of 28,245 requests, almost 3,000 of which were received from non-CIA requesters. In addition, the Liaison Division received and disseminated over 263,000 documents (including cables and airgrams)*--an increase of almost 23,000 over the total of the previous fiscal year. 78/ 79/

It was thus evident by 1950 that OCD had become a reality within the profession; that its functions had been soundly conceived and developed. In short,

* It is interesting that 22 years later, in FY 1971, the 12-month total for collateral documents received had stabilized at almost exactly the same figure--260,000 (exclusive of cables which, in later years, were held for only several months). The all-time collateral document peak of 409,000 was registered in FY 1963. From that point forward, however, the true work measurement had to include the Special Intelligence documents which the office began receiving in 1963 and which, in FY 1971, alone totalled more than 582,000 items.

the planners had accomplished what they had set out to achieve--that is, the creation of a first-of-its-kind, centralized intelligence reference facility. By that year, the office had grown into an on-going and youthfully successful operation. Constant change, both major and minor, would, of course, continue to occur and the system was still a far cry from the comparatively sophisticated machine that would evolve in future years. Nonetheless, OCD had become an effective and viable operation. The basic problem was no longer one of trying to make the machine work and prove its value. Rather, the major difficulty was the operation's inability to keep pace with the soaring request load. The divisions' administrative files for 1950 reflect a heavy use of overtime, the need for additional personnel and the development of backlogs in pending requests, filing and reproduction. In the Library, where the March document flow reached a total of 23,000--a 37% increase over the 1949 monthly average--a seven-day work week was implemented and the staff members were given an option of Saturday

or Sunday work. In the Biographic Register, the Regional Branch (for nonscientific personalities) had become seriously overloaded, particularly because of the heavy volume of requests being levied by the Special Research Center in "Q" Building (later the Office of Current Intelligence) and the recently formed Office of Policy Coordination. In the other divisions, conditions were similar and action was taken to pare back responsibilities. In July, plans were approved to relieve OCD of the Agency's machine records functions as recommended by the Management Staff's survey team. Since the CIA machine system had begun in OCD (in the pre-merger Reference Center), the office had been assigned responsibility for applying machine techniques to the Agency's accounting and administrative record keeping. By 1950, nine such programs were being performed by the Machine Division's Administrative Project Branch, ranging from personnel statistical records and payroll accounting to stock inventory and machine utilization records. On 17 July 1950, Acting Executive Ted , approved the transfer of all administrative

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support by machine techniques: from OCD to Management's Special Support Staff (SSS) in "L" Building. It is doubtful that the move lightened the work burden on OCD since 11 slots were also transferred. [redacted] who had been Chief of the Machine Division since its inception, also moved with the function to SSS, presumably to serve as supervisor-planner for all Agency machine operations.* He was subsequently succeeded as MD's chief of his former deputy, 25X1A [redacted]. Other functional transfers were effected. By the end of the year, IR had arranged to transfer to the Air Force responsibility for foreign airfield activities and had initiated formal proposals to transfer its files on foreign transportation and communications systems to the Army Map Service.**

25X1A9A

* By 1950 there were already six separate CIA machine installations: OO's Contact Division in South Building; OCD in M Building (by far the most extensive operation); the Special Research Center in Q; OSO's Communications Division in L (where SSS would also be established); and MD's Board of Geographic Names unit in South Interior Building.

** The transfers to AMS were never effected and the functions remained with IR.

J.L.

25X1A

The situation was further aggravated by the outbreak of the Korean War and all of OCD was forced into a six-day work week from mid-July to early October. To help absorb the ballooning workload, Dr. Andrews in May had requested an additional [REDACTED] 25X1A

[REDACTED]

In addition, the size of the division's files were already beginning to signal future space problems. By June of 1950, the Intellofax file contained almost 315,000 documents compared to the December 1949 total of 150,000 unindexed reports. In BR, the 25,000

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[REDACTED] of December 1949 had increased to about 95,000; IR's industrial installation files had grown from 25,000 to almost 50,000 during the same period; and late-starting GR had, by mid-1950, amassed files containing 250,000 ground and 20,000

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[REDACTED] Key personnel assignments remained relatively static during 1950. In June, [REDACTED], OCD's Deputy Assistant Director, returned to the Army and was not immediately replaced. In December, two former BR officers, [REDACTED] transferred out of OCD, the former to Administrative Services and the latter to OPC.

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Despite its growth problems, the overall success of the OCD operation by the end of 1950 was indisputable. In addition to the technical and analytical expertise which had been developed by desk personnel, OCD's success was attributable, in no small degree, to the office's machine systems' growth. By the close of the year, Intellofax had become effectively operational. The system would never cease to be a target of customer criticism but it nonetheless represented a technological breakthrough. Irrespective of its early flaws and the shortcomings that would draw fire throughout its existence, the Intellofax System provided the intelligence analyst with a tool which had never previously been available anywhere. It presented, for the first time, a solution to the analyst's historical problem: the painstaking and time-consuming effort necessary to pull together all available intelligence material bearing on a given problem. Whatever its shortcomings, Intellofax did provide the intelligence analyst, to a very considerable degree, a mechanical means of readily obtaining access to all pertinent intelligence

documents, thereby meaningfully increasing the time available to him for pursuing his primary function -- the production of intelligence.

The Intellofax equipment and procedures that were originally in use would change drastically in future years. For at least two years after it became fully operational, concurrent "shake-down" tests would be conducted and even during the first year of full operation (1950), drastic changes were effected. At the outset, for instance, it had been planned to electronically transmit the Intellofax tapes to requesters. Late in 1949 and early in 1950, the first Faxcard transmitters and receivers were delivered by 25X1A [redacted] and installed -- the former in the Library and the latter in M and Q Buildings. In theory, the selected Faxcards (IBM punched cards) could be reproduced by ~~Facsimile machines~~ onto the Intellofax tape which, in turn would be fed into the transmitter and electronically sent to the receiver closest to the requester. Within months, however, technical and human difficulties developed. First, transmission presented security problems which, at that time, could not be quickly solved. In addition,

customers balked at having to load the paper tapes into the receiving machines and insisted that inter-office mail would generally provide sufficiently speedy service for the transmission of their requested Intellofax tape runs. Considering the multitude of other technical matters demanding attention, and the apparent lukewarm attitude of the customer sector, the decision was made about mid-1950 to abandon the transmission phase of the Intellofax System. It was never resurrected. The basic Intellofax System, however, would continue to develop* as the first machine-based document retrieval system within the intelligence profession, largely sustaining Dr. Andrews' earlier observation in a status report to the DCI when he suggested

*ALSO THEY CAME TO
IN BLDG TO GET THEM
A LATER TO THE STADIUM*

It is quite possible that the central reference system being built by CIA will ultimately prove the most important central intelligence service which the Agency provides. 80/

* The Intellofax System would endure for 17 years until 1967 when, largely for reasons of economy and redirection of effort, it would be replaced by AEGIS (Already Existing General Information System) which, in truth, was indeed far more general and far less detailed than Intellofax.

In retrospect, it would appear that probably the most significant acknowledgement of OCD's success status was the decision to leave the office untouched when the Agency was sweepingly reorganized in late 1950 and 1951 -- particularly the production offices. During ^{1950,} ~~that year~~, it will be recalled, the departing DCI, Admiral Hillenkoetter, had postponed all reorganization until his successor had had the opportunity to consider the recommendations made by both the Dulles Survey Group and the Agency's own Management Staff. With regard to OCD, the Dulles team had urged complete dismemberment of the office while the Management task team had recommended transfer of OCD's liaison and administrative machine functions to other Agency components (the remaining functions to be carried out by a renamed "Office of Reference and Dissemination"). After his arrival in October, Smith committed himself to the Dulles Committee's recommendations and quickly thereafter (on 13 November) announced the formation of a new Office of Research and Reports (ORR), the establishment of the Office of National Estimates and, a few days later, the

Bedell?
Smith
yes - covered
in previous
chapter

Office of Intelligence Coordination (OIC).^{*} In view of the DCI's announced approval of the Dulles findings, the end of OCD and transfer of its functions to the new offices was expected momentarily. In fact, the machine unit, the Library and the Registers were actually regrouped as branches in a proposed organizational chart for the new ORR. As previously noted, however, General Smith's final decision in December was to leave OCD intact and the office was grouped with the production offices under the new DD/CI, William H. Jackson. Only minor changes were made in OCD's charter: responsibility for the Agency's Records Management Program (CIA Archives) and mail and courier service were shifted to the Deputy for Administration.

* OIC was the expanded "Coordination Division" proposed by the Dulles group to replace COAPS, the five-month old successor to ICAPS.